Strengthening Remote Warfare Capabilities by Boosting Resiliency in the RPA Program

University of Virginia | Hacking 4 Defense

Caroline Still, Kaylee Moore, Strother Cech, Thien-Kim Dinh





The RPA program is crucial to the modern warfighting capabilities of the US Air Force, but high burnout rates make this program




Source: Unmanned Aerial Systems, GAO 2019





Air Force active duty suicides are trending up compared to other service branches



Source: DoDSER CY 2019



Remote warriors have **higher suicide ideation** rates than other Air Force personnel

VS

REMOTE WARRIORS

6-11%
surveyed reported
experiencing suicidal
thoughts in the past week

Source: Goodman et al., A Reassessment of Risk Factors and Frequency of Suicide Ideastion Among US Air Force Remote Warrsions (2018)

GENERAL AIR FORCE

surveyed reported experiencing suicidal thoughts **in the past year**

Source: Snarr et al., Recent Suicide Ideation and Suicide Attempts in a Large-Scale Survey of the U.S. Air Force (2010)





"Seven out of the ten airmen I've had here are trying or are going to get out or have expressed extreme depression or talked of suicide."


— RPA Commander, 2018 RAND Study





RPA retention rates are **significantly lower** than other types of Air Force pilots

RPA retention is less than 10 percent while take-rates for other pilots are consistently about 44 percent





RPAs are vital to **defeating** current threats and **deterring**

future aggression



Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recommends that the Air Force increase drone forces from 25 to 43 squadrons


Commanders of CFNTCOM and AFRICOM describe the MQ-9 Reaper



force as crucial in **combating** both violent extremist groups and regional rival Iran

Russia and China are developing rapid aggression capabilities the cover of increasingly capable reconnaissance-strike networks









AGENDA

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2. CONTEXT

3 IMPLEMENTATION OBSTACLES

OUR RECOMMENDATIONS







EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

Problem:

- 1. The burnout rates of RPA pilots are unsustainably high
- 2. Air Force leadership recognizes the problem but fails to implement known solutions

Recommendations:

- 1. Invest in RPA-specific recruitment & promotion pathways
- 2. Increase behavioral health support
- 3. Improve RPA logistics and scheduling





CONTEXT

ISSUES RECOGNIZED, BUT PROBLEM CONTINUES



THE 2014 GAO REPORT

The GAO report found that the Air Force fails to prioritize RPA human capital efforts in order to achieve program goals

Ineffective recruitment

Operating below optimum crew ratio

INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT &

POOR QUALITY OF LIFE

Low education & promotion rates


Limited access to support services





THE 2020 GAO REPORT

The GAO report found that the Air Force still faced the same challenges as 2014 with minimal attempted improvement









IMPLEMENTATION OBSTACLES

COST



CULTURE



COMPLACENCY







Obstacle 1: The Air Force is deterred by **high short-term costs** of reforming the RPA program

Operation

Revamped

recruitment

The annual operating cost for an MQ-9 Reaper is about **four times** that of an F-16 or A-10.

Retention incentives

Air Force relies on special and incentive pays (S&I) for improving retention rates. Congress appropriated \$1.2 billion for these in FY19.



An RPA-specific recruitment pipeline would require diverting resources and funds to this new program.

According to a recent RAND study, RPA bases were generally seen as "undesirable". USAF appropriated \$85 million for a new RPA center at Holloman AFB that never Reform is an investment, but returns will outweigh short-term costs.

RPAs are only going to become more important to the Air Force mission moving forward.
Retaining RPA pilots and their specialized skill set is more cost-effective than constantly retraining new pilots.

Source: MQ-9's Cost and Performance, Wheeler, 2012; US Department of the Air Force FY20 Personnel Posture; Task & Purpose






RPA program draws from many parts of the Air Force budget

RPA program draws from these areas of the budget

Any funding for new policy initiatives would probably impact these areas as well







What is an RPA pilot worth?

	Per unit	Total FY2021
COST OF EQUIPMENT	\$82.9 M	\$6.34 B
COST OF TRAINING	Several Million	Millions x 800 RPA pilots
HUMAN CAPITAL	PRICELESS	





Obstacle 2: Air Force **culture neglects RPA pilots**, revolving around fighter pilots instead

Fighter pilots
dominate
hierarchy as the
Air Force's
prized
specialization

RPA pilots do not get the same recognition or awards

RPA pilots are not **promoted** at comparable rates

RPA pilots are underappreciated by Air Force leadership

RPA pilots remain undervalued and underrepresented






"The Air Force public affairs office never lets anyone know the value of what we do."

— RPA Pilot, 2018 RAND Study





Obstacle 3: RPA pilots, despite adversity, still get the job done, enabling Air Force complacency with the struggling program







The Culture and Process Improvement Program (CPIP) exemplifies a weak and failed initiative that is touted as successful and complete

CPIP

OFFICIAL STATUS

90%

- Air Combat Command (ACC) established the CPIP in 2015 to identify and address stress and quality of life issues within the MQ-9 Reaper RPA community
- Effort collected **nearly 2,500 inputs** from the RPA community through surveys and in-person engagement
- Developed **over 140 initiatives** to address concerns regarding missions, quality of life, locations and basing options, training, etc.
- June 2019: The Air Force has achieved an "almost 90% solution"

CPIP

ACTUAL STATUS

- Initiatives **no longer tracked** because they have "reached the point of diminishing returns" and **CPIP office closed**
- "Completed" = handed over to someone else
- Unfulfilled initiatives include combat-to-dwell, security clearances for medical and chaplain personnel, and spousal and child support
- GAO: The completion and solution discussed in June 2019 "may not present a transparent account of what has been completed and what remains to be accomplished"



2020





High RPA operations tempo and success rates speak for themselves

9,100

Drone sorties from 2016-2018

1,800

Number of drone strikes from 2016-2018

~100%

Successful strike rate 2016-2018

Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism





""If you look at all the stress we have on the [RPA] pilots that are at Creech – six days on, 12-hour shifts, in combat, 72 hours a week without a break. Then they have to drive all the way back to [Las] Vegas where their families are, it's just a huge, huge stressor.""

— Gen. John Hyten, Air Force Space Command, 2017





4

RECOMMENDATIONS



Promotion pathways for RPA pilots boost representation in Air Force leadership and provide opportunities for growth



RPA Recruitment Pipeline

The Air Force does not have a designated RPA recruiter, and it does not demonstrate prioritization of recruitment based on specific mission needs.



Effective Instruction

Required instruction staff numbers are understated because they are based on a dissimilar program over a decade old.



RPA Promotion Pathway

RPA compete with fighter pilots for the same promotions. This is counterproductive.

Behavioral health support prioritizes human capital and boosts RPA pilot resiliency

CHAPLAINS & PSYCHOLOGISTS

Prioritize mental health by ensuring capacity for post-strike, one-on-one check-ins



SECURITY CLEARANCES

Increase allotted security clearances for support team members

FAMILY

Integrate pilot spouses and children into mission support and health considerations



TEAM EFFORT RECOGNIZED

Invest in family care and support initiatives, including childcare

BASE COMMUNITY

Promote opportunities for team bonding and squadron cohesion on base



CAMARADERIE

Mandatory stand-down days and off-days to boost morale and team mentality







Logistics & scheduling improvements mitigate operational burnout and optimize mission readiness

FLIGHT LINE MANDATES

Mitigate operational burnout by stemming demand to fit existing supply of flight lines and personnel.






SCHEDULING

Slowing op tempo and extending shifts allows for healthier sleep patterns, and changing shifts for time of year.

COMBAT-TO-DWELL

Improve existing policy so that RPA pilots are not "on call" during dwell cycle.







QUESTIONS?



Problem Sponsors









OUR TEAM



CAROLINE STILL
4th Year
Majors: Global Security &
Justice, French





KAYLEE MOORE

3rd Year

Majors: Foreign Affairs

& History

STROTHER CECH 4th Year Majors: Foreign Affairs & History



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Backup Slides

RPA demand and advantages Moral injury Scheduling breakdown

RPA recruitment Air Force suicide Flight line mandates

Global focus Behavioral health support Combat to dwell

Operational factors Leadership profiles Burnout factors

Psychological factors Attempted improvements Promotion rates





RPA demand is high and increasing

+

Stealth

Unlike manned aircraft, RPAs are quiet and can remain undetected at an altitude of 25,000 feet for extended periods of time.

Keep troops out of physical danger

Traditionally, certain missions have required American troops to be physically on the ground. RPAs help mitigate that risk.

Supports a variety of different missions

RPAs can be extremely valuable assets in nearly any mission. This might include ISR, targeted strikes, or ground mission overwatch.

Multiple advanced capabilities

RPAs like the MQ-9
Reaper have a variety of advancing sensing and kinetic weapons capabilities, making them extremely

High demand for RPAs that is only going to increase over time.

In the age of technological innovation, remote warfare technology is going to play ar increasingly larger role in the world. More and more CAPs are going to be needed for mission support.

Addressing the issue of resilience before it grows out of control is critical.







RPAs have **two distinct recruitment and training pathways** that lead to a **common frustration**

UNIVERSITY PIPELINE

Recruits from ROTC, service academies, and Officer Candidate School.

Complete traditional fighter pilot training, then tasked with RPA.



CAREER RPA PIPELINE

Recruits intend to become RPA pilots, but they are given minimal information on career realities.

Complete RPA specific pilot training.

FRUSTRATION

University recruits are disappointed to pilot unmanned aircraft.
Career recruits feel misled.







In the changing nature of war, drones are increasingly vital

- ➤ US spends 57
 percent of
 unclassified R&D
 funds on UAV
 technology in next
 decade
- Near peers like
 Russia and China are
 investing in drones
 too, and their
 programs are
 catching up

UAV Production by Re	gion: Current and	Projected Values
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Country/Region	2017		2026		
	\$ Millions	# of Units	\$ Millions	# of Units	
USA	1,755	1,179	4,400	2,530	
Asia-Pacific	1,092	724	2,523	1,134	
Europe	714	666	1,524	972	
Middle East	609	509	1,534	273	
Africa	20	12	114	113	
Americas	1	27	213	32	

Source: 2019-2020 World Military Unmanned Aerial Systems Market Profile & Forecast, Teal Group







The MQ-9 Reaper is extremely expensive to **build** and **operate**

UNIT COST PER CAP

\$136.1 MILLION

MAINTENANCE COSTS
PER YEAR PER CAP

\$27.7

MILLION

COMPARED

F-16 Fighting Falcon > \$30.8 million

A-10 Thunderbolt II > \$21.3 million

COMPARED

F-16 Fighting Falcon > \$5.4 million

A-10 Thunderbolt II > \$5.5 million

Source: MQ-9's Cost and Performance, Wheeler, 2012







The RPA mission consists of unique operational factors

Combat to Cul-de-Sac

- ➤ Continuous transition ➤ Lo
- Mentally at war
- Unable to fully meet work and home expectations

between war and peace

Cannot discuss details of work while at home

Scheduling

- > Long shifts and work weeks
- Constant state of "on-call"
- No end in sight for bad shift schedules
- > No guaranteed breaks
- > Inadequate decompression time

Poor Unit Cohesion

- > Conflicting shift schedules Short-term planning
- Limited time to socialize outside of work, family is prioritized.
- ➤ Limited community events, less than ⅓ of squadron is able to attend.

Little Recognition

- ➤ Low promotion rates relative to manned aircraft
- Mentally at war, not considered deployed No combat awards / medals Few understand the implications of their job







Psychological factors contributing to moral injury

PARTICIPATING IN VIOLENCE

WITNESSING VIOLENCE **HUMANITY OF TARGETS AVOIDING WEAKNESS** Get to know the We watch who Stigma around target's personal we employ usage of existing lives, day to day weapons on, supports, loss of activities, food, then get the flight status, family, etc, battle damage status in the extensive assessment. community, surveillance including seeing losing a allows for Constantly body parts...on promotion. witnessing Failure to association with the ground." brutal acts of protect the enemy. violence American contributes to troops, civilian casualties. no psychological framework to stress. Continued rationalize kills. surveillance limited support. from strike to funeral.





COMBAT INTIMACY



What is moral injury?

In order for moral injury to occur, the individual must feel like a transgression occurred and that they or someone else crossed a line with respect to their moral beliefs. Moral injury does not trigger a "fight or flight" response.

It is possible to have a moral injury and not meet the requirements for PTSD.

How is it different from PTSD?

There is a great deal of overlap between moral injury and PTSD, but they are exclusive conditions. For PTSD, a trauma happens to an individual. For moral injury, the individual undergoes a morally challenging ordeal.

The treatment methods for PTSD, such as revisiting the trauma, do not work for moral injury.

Source: National Center for PTSD, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs







Behavioral health support for the RPA community is lacking

HUMAN PERFORMANCE

- August 2019: Psychologist position unfilled for over 9 months
- Team members physically
 located at Creech, but also
 responsible for all bases under
 the same wing (Ellsworth in
 South Dakota, Whiteman in
 Missouri, and Shaw in South
 Carolina)
- Chaplain: assigned
 responsibility for more
 than 3,000 people at a
 time

MEDICAL SERVICES

- > Shaw Air Force Base: supposed to have six medical technicians and two doctors, actually has only TWO medical technicians for RPA community
- Creech Air Force Base:
 20, 714 man-hours are
 wasted each year due to
 personnel needing to
 obtain medical services,
 the equivalent of losing
 11.5 people in a given year

CHILD CARE


- Across RPA community: Childcare services "low quality" and limited for 24/7 shift workers
- Cannon Air Force Base: has two Child Development Centers, only operate Mon-Fri from 6am to 6pm, long waiting list for admission
- ➤ Creech Air Force Base:
 NO childcare on base







The Air Force has an increasingly dire suicide problem



*2019 and 2020 suicide attempts are projected values







Leadership profiles reveals dominance of fighter pilots

Command	Commander	Flight Experiance
Air Combat Command	Gen Mark D. Kelly	T-37, T-38, F-15E, F/A-18, F-16, F-35A
Air Education and Training Command	Lt Gen Marshall B. Webb	UH-1H/N, MH-53H/J/M, CV-22B, MC-130H, MC-130P
Air Force Global Strike Command	Gen Timothy Ray	T-37, T-38, B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, C-21, C-27A and C-208.
Air Force Materiel Command	Gen Arnold W. Bunch Jr.	B-52, B-2, KC-135, F-16, T-38
Air Force Reserve Command	Lt Gen Richard W. Scobee	F-16
Air Force Special Operations Command	Lt Gen James C. Slife	MH-53, MQ-1
Air Mobility Command	Gen Jacqueline D. Van Ovost	C-32A, C-12C, C-17A, C-23A, C-141B/A, KC-135R, F-15B, F-16B, T-1A, T- 37B and T-38A
Pacific Air Forces	Gen Kenneth S. Wilsbach	F-16C, F-22A, MC-12W, F-15A-D, T-38, T-37
United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa	Gen Jeffrey L. Harrigian	F-22, F-15C, A/OA-37 and MQ-1

Source: Air Force Senior Leader Biographies, af.mil







Recent initiatives made minimal improvements with limited results

IMPROVEMENTS

- > Expanded RPA operations to Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina
- Decreased the number of combat lines
- Created new division at Air Force headquarters to oversee RPA personnel matters
- Established a medal to specifically recognize RPA contributions



RESULTS

- Did not address real underlying problems
- New base still not in desirable locations
- > Dwell time still requested by senior base leaders
- ➤ RPA job duties don't align with reasons pilots joined Air Force
- Did not address career opportunity wishes







Potential schedule changes optimize mission readiness

Example of Current Schedule

- → 5 week rotations (days, nights, mids).
- → Rotate 10 times per year.
- → Three teams: Red, White, Blue
- → 5 days on, three days off.
- → Can get called in on days off.
- → 6-8 hours spent flying
- Upgrades, testing, meetings done daily before/after flying.

Potential Schedule Changes

- → Longer rotations, 12-16 weeks (days, nights, mids).
- → Rotate every 3-4 months (i.e. combat to dwell).
- → 2 teams
- Training, upgrades, testing, meetings all done during "dwell" period.

Comparative Advantage

- → Slower operations tempo.
- → Healthier.

- → Better long-term planning.
- → More consistent.







Flight line mandates mitigate operational burnout


Prioritization of human capital.

Ex: 50 pilots available to fly. Rather than lowering manning ratio, only 5 CAPS fly until team change-out or the 5 return to fly during their tour.



Maintain minimum manning ratio at all times.

Ex: 60 pilots for 6 CAPS.



High and increasing demand for RPAs.

Total 65 CAPs, 2-6 per squadron.

Insufficient manning.

10:1 ratio of aircrew to CAP. Some operate below this ratio.







Combat to dwell prioritizes human capital

1:1 ratio

Functions exactly like deployment to dwell.

- ➤ 2-3 months in combat, or 8-12 weeks.
- > Aircrew in combat are responsible for flying, and nothing else.
- ➤ Hours are long, and op-tempo is high, but there is an "end in sight."

teams

At all times, half the squadron is in combat, and the other is in dwell.

- > Dwell period cannot be touched without higher authority signing it off at a minimum of 1:1 ratio.
- Dwell time is used for training, upgrades, testing, meetings, and other duties.
- > Only 40 hour workweek while in dwell.

3 benefits

Improving mission readiness and efficacy by mitigating personnel burnout.


- Minimizes constant transition between war and peacetime.
- ➤ Gives RPA personnel a break. Prevents overworking, improves family life.
- > Smaller units and consistent schedules improve unit cohesion.







RPA pilots have an unusual mission with unique challenges







LACK OF RECOGNITION & SUPPORT















Promotion rates have improved, but there is still progress to

be made





Source: GAO, "AIR FORCE Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots," April 2014

Source: GAO, "UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS Air Force Pilot Promotion Rates Have Increased but Oversight Process of Some Positions Could Be Enhanced," February 2019





